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Abstract 
This paper describes an approach developed to measure regional economic resilience across 
Europe which is novel in three key dimensions. Firstly, it seeks to date regional downturns as 
opposed to assuming that all regional economies are affected by economic shocks at the 
same point in time; secondly, it measures the amplitude and duration of economic 
downturns and subsequent recoveries; and thirdly, as well as measuring recovery, it 
measures the resistance of regional economies to economic shocks. The paper applies this 
methodology to selected European countries to provide an analysis of differential regional 
responses to several economic shocks since the early 1990s. The paper then reflects upon 
the utility of this methodology for operationalising regional economic resilience in cross-
comparative studies. 
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1. Introduction 
The effects of the post-2008 economic crisis across Europe have been widespread and 
significantly contagious but also highly geographically uneven, thereby drawing attention to 
differences between regions in their vulnerability to economic shocks and their ability to 
adapt to serious disruptions in the economic environment (Jones et al, 2010; Martin, 2011; 
Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2014). This has intensified the interest of evolutionary economic 
geographers in the concept of regional economic resilience which offers the potential to 
illuminate the capacities of local and regional economies to withstand and recover from 
economic shocks, and to adapt their development paths accordingly (Davies, 2011; Fingleton 
et al, 2012; Martin, 2012). Given the breadth of the disciplinary origins and applications of 
the resilience concept however, coupled with the relative newness of evolutionary 
theorizing in economic geography, the conceptual framing and clarity of the notion of 
regional economic resilience remains the subject of considerable academic debate (Bristow 
and Healy, 2014; Martin and Sunley, 2014; Boschma, 2014). 
 
Nothwithstanding this, economic resilience has quickly gathered credence as a concept with 
policy-makers and practitioners seeking to understand both why some places are better able 
than others to withstand economic shocks and/or recover quickly from them, and what they 
themselves might do to influence these capacities (Dawley et al, 2010; CLES, 2010). Indeed, 
policy discourse around economic development at national, regional and local scales is 
iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ƌeplete ǁith talk of the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͚ďuildiŶg a ƌesilieŶt eĐoŶoŵǇ͛ ;OsďoƌŶe, 
2014). 
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Recent years have witnessed considerable growth in the number and variety of resilience 
indicators and toolkits being used by practitioners eager to understand whether a particular 
local or regional economy is resilient, and policy-makers keen to assess and benchmark the 
resilience of their economies relative to others (see, for example, CLES, 2010; Greenham et 
al, 2013; IPPR North, 2014; ARUP, 2014). However, the practical development of indicators 
has clearly run ahead of conceptual thinking on resilience. There is indeed no single agreed 
approach to the measurement of resilience and the growing diversity of indicators risks 
further diluting the clarity and utility of the resilience concept (Christopherson et al, 2010; 
Martin and Sunley, 2014). Existing indices remain largely unproven and past indices have 
proved to be inaccurate in predicting the resilience of economies to the most recent 
economic crisis (Briguglio et al, 2006).  Yet robust measures of resilience are clearly needed, 
not least to help illuminate what Rose and Krausmann (2013) refer to as ͚aĐtioŶaďle 
ǀaƌiaďles͛, oƌ the keǇ eleŵeŶts that ĐaŶ ďe iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ ƌegioŶal aĐtoƌs iŶ pƌoĐesses of 
shock recovery. In our rush to identify what makes an economy resilient to economic shocks 
we are in danger of losing an objective means of first identifying which economies were 
resilient to an economic shock and which were not.  
 
Operationalising the concept of resilience is by no means an easy task however. First and 
foremost, the developing literature on regional economic resilience indicates that it is a 
highly complex and multi-dimensional concept. The increasingly prominent evolutionary 
ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of ƌesilieŶĐe sees it as eŵďƌaĐiŶg ďoth peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe outĐoŵes oƌ a ƌegioŶ͛s state 
following shocks, as well a more processual entity capturing the capacities or attributes a 
region has to enable it to adapt in the face the change has wrought (Foster, 2012; Martin, 
2012; Boschma, 2014; Bristow and Healy, 2014). Consequently, any approach to 
measurement faces the challenge of capturing this conceptual complexity in a manner which 
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remains meaningful and useful, whilst addressing additional questions including whether 
resilience is being measured in absolute terms or relative to the performance of others, as 
well as questions about the timing and nature of the shock and recovery. These issues are 
further complicated in the case of comparative regional analysis where shocks and stresses 
may affect regions at different times and in a different order of magnitude (Foster, 2012). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this debate by developing an approach for 
operationalising the concept of regional economic resilience in a cross-comparative analysis 
of the effects of the post-2008 global financial crisis on European regions. We develop an 
approach which focuses on measuring resilience in terms of post-shock outcomes, but which 
adapts available methods for dating regional business cycles to capture differences in both 
the timing of when the shock hit regions, and the amplitude and duration of both the 
downturns experienced and subsequent recoveries. The paper is now structured as follows. 
The next section examines the challenges which surround operationalising the complex, 
evolutionary conception of regional economic resilience. In section three, we detail the 
distinctive features of our approach, whilst section four illustrates some key results from 
applying this approach to the regional experiences of the recent economic crisis across 
Europe. Section five provides reflections on the utility of this approach and the paper 
concludes by identifying how this may help advance the operationalisation of resilience in 
cross-comparative research. 
 
2. The challenges of operationalising resilience  
Recent scholarly contributions have made significant progress in understanding how 
regional economic resilience may be conceptualized. In contrast to the engineering 
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conception of resilience which focuses on the resistance of a system to shocks and the speed 
of its return oƌ ͚ďouŶĐe-ďaĐk͛ to a pre-shock state or equilibrium (Pendall et al, 2010), 
evolutionary economic geographers increasingly advocate an evolutionary, dynamic notion 
of resilience in line with the understanding that regional economies are characterized by 
complex, non-linear and non-equilibrium dynamics (Martin and Sunley, 2007; Boschma and 
Martin, 2010). This asserts that regional economies have empirically identifiable long-run 
and path-dependent development trajectories, with the resilience concept providing a 
valuable focus for understanding the specific impact of shocks and their role in shaping 
these trajectories and paths (Martin and Sunley, 2014). As such, there is an emerging 
consensus that regional economic resilience may be defined as the capacity of a regional or 
local economy to withstand, recover from and reorganize in the face of market, competitive 
and environmental shocks to its developmental growth path (Cooke, 2012; Martin and 
Sunley, 2014; Bristow and Healy, 2014).  
 
Evolutionary theorists also assert that resilience must be conceived as a multi-dimensional 
and indeed processual entity. This embraces the need to understand not only the nature and 
duƌatioŶ of the shoĐk aŶd the ƌegioŶ͛s ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ to it, ďut also its ĐapaĐities to ǁithstaŶd 
or resist the shock in the first place, the robustness of its firms and institutions in responding 
to it, aŶd the eǆteŶt aŶd Ŷatuƌe of the ƌegioŶal eĐoŶoŵǇ͛s ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ fƌoŵ it ;MaƌtiŶ ϮϬϭϮ; 
Martin and Sunley, 2014). This complexity is the source of one of the critical problems which 
has surrounded much of the resilience literature particularly in relation to its measurement, 
and that is the tendency to conflate and confuse resilience outcomes and resilience 
capacities (Bristow and Healy, 2014). 
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This problem can perhaps be usefully understood and illuminated by drawing parallels with 
how resilience is understood and conceptualized in different disciplinary contexts. For 
example, psychologists understand the resilience of individuals in relation to shocks or 
traumas such as ill-health as being multi-dimensional (see, for example, Schoon, 2006). It is 
in part revealed by certain outcomes, such as the ability to avoid or resist illness in the first 
place, or the speed of recovery from illness (perhaps measured by the number of days of 
absence from the workplace). However, just looking at those indicators alone would not tell 
you much about why one person was more resilient than another. Nor would it tell you if an 
individual was likely to be resilient to future ailments. For this you would have to understand 
their resilience or adaptive capacities – the means they have to both help them resist and 
recover. These are the assets that individuals can mobilise and manage in the face of a 
shock, whether these be inherited genetic predispositions, or the capacity to reduce their 
exposure or vulnerability to risks (such as through changing their environment, diet or 
lifestyle). They can also take actions to mitigate the impact of the illness (for example by 
taking medicines, or appropriate rest), and respond or develop coping mechanisms through 
its duration so that key functions and activities are continued (such as asking colleagues or 
friends to cover work or other tasks, or drawing on savings to pay for health care or lost 
earnings etc). Equally, indicators of resilience outcomes alone do not provide sufficient 
insight into whether past events have weakened or stƌeŶgtheŶed aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s constitution 
or sensitivity to their environment, nor about the surrounding environment itself. Individuals 
may be resilient to smaller shocks, but less resilient to larger shocks, such as a more virulent 
form of illness, or to a series of shocks.   
 
The critical point is that the shock impacts differently on different individuals who have 
different capacities to anticipate, respond and cope. Understanding the nature of the shock 
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and how the external environment has changed is, however critical, and it is increasingly 
acknowledged that in all contexts, resilience is performed or emerges when systems are 
confronted by a shock or crisis (Davoudi, 2012). Thus, as Martin and Sunley (2014) observe, 
it is only when a shock occurs that it is possible to ascertain whether, and to what extent, 
the oŶgoiŶg eǀolutioŶaƌǇ adaptatioŶ of a ƌegioŶ͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ has iŵďued it ǁith ƌesilieŶĐe. 
 
This implies that in measuring resilience, it is critically important to distinguish between the 
ŵeasuƌeŵeŶt of a ƌegioŶ͛s speĐifiĐ post-shock outcomes, or its revealed resilience, and 
ŵeasuƌeŵeŶt of the ƌegioŶ͛s ƌesilieŶĐe ĐapaĐities. IŶdiĐatoƌs of adaptiǀe ĐapaĐitǇ, ŵaŶǇ of 
which feature in some of the developing policy and practice metrics of resilience referred to 
earlier, do not reveal resilience. They simply point to resilience capacities or the adaptive 
mechanisms and processes which imbue a regional economy with the means to be resilient 
(as Martin and Sunley, 2014). They are the factors that need to be examined in order to 
understand how and why resilience outcomes vary. These factors may be shaped by a wide 
range of structural and behavioural factors and attributes, the relative importance of which 
is subject to increasing debate and which is likely to require both quantitative assessment 
and a more localized and qualitative ontology (Bristow and Healy, 2014; Martin and Sunley, 
2014). 
 
There are several challenges to be addressed in measuring resilience outcomes, particularly 
in cross-comparative research.  Firstly, there is a need to identify some meaningful 
͚ƌefeƌeŶĐe state͛, ƌegiŵe oƌ path, agaiŶst ǁhiĐh the iŵpaĐt of a shoĐk ĐaŶ ďe ŵeasuƌed aŶd 
the extent and nature of recovery from that shock be judged (Martin and Sunley, 2014). Are 
resilient economies those that continued to grow in the face of an economic shock, or those 
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that recovered from a shock? If it is those that recovered, then at what point can recovery 
be judged to have occurred? 
 
The appropriate metric for identifying this reference state also needs to be considered. 
Measuring resilience as performance or outcome also requires identification of comparable 
economic indicators (such as GDP and employment), an understanding of how to deal with 
mixed results and trade-offs (e.g. sometimes output will show positive performance 
whereas employment will not), as well as an understanding of what the perceived resistance 
or recovery state is in the absence of a known equilibrium. This is particularly challenging 
when it is apparent that shocks may have a diverse range of hysteretic effects on the 
development paths of regions, permanently changing the composition of their economies or 
the behaviour of key actors within them (Martin, 2012). A related challenge is to determine 
whether resilience is being analysed in absolute terms (how all regions performed relative to 
the shock) or in relative terms (which regions performed better or were more resilient than 
others). Resilient outcomes may be judged relative to a ƌegioŶ͛s oǁŶ reference state or 
͚Ŷoƌŵs͛ ;pƌe-shock levels, patterns and fluctuations in these performance indicators). They 
may also be judged in comparative context (with other regions in the same nation or in 
other nations). 
 
Secondly, there is a need to define the shock or disturbance under analysis. At the 
macroeconomic level, economic shocks come in many shapes and guises including: financial 
shocks; fiscal shocks; exchange rate shocks; commodity price shocks; 
productivity/technology shocks; regulatory shocks, and, through disasters, shocks to capital 
stocks (Ahrend et al, 2011).  At a local level we may also see shocks derived from (local) 
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decision-making processes, such as the closure or down-scaling of major employers. These 
shocks may overlie more ͚slowburn͛ processes of economic restructuring and transformation 
(Pendall et al, 2010). 
 
A key challenge for any study examining economic resilience is identifying when a shock has 
actually occurred. Taking the argument that an economy is always reacting to changing 
circumstances, that it is Ŷeǀeƌ aĐtuallǇ iŶ a state of ͚eƋuiliďƌiuŵ͛ ;MaƌtiŶ, ϮϬϭϮͿ, ŵeaŶs that 
it is always beset by economic shocks, some minor and some major. It is only when these are 
of a certain magnitude, or occur in a particular context, that the effects become observable. 
In this regard, economic shocks can be compared to physical earthquakes. Small regular 
tremors pass without observation except by the most sensitive instruments. More sizeable 
earthquakes cause greater levels of damage, depending on the extent to which a place had 
planned and prepared for such an event.   
 
For some phenomena – such as the closure of a major local employer, or the closing of 
access to a key market – dating a shock can be relatively straightforward. For other 
phenomena, such as the recent financial crisis, this can be more difficult to discern. In an 
authoritative review of the literature on identifying financial shocks, the IMF noted that ͚the 
dating of debt and banking crises is typically based on qualitative and judgmental analyses͛ 
(Claessens and Kose, 2013, p.22). The challenge is exacerbated when considering the 
prevalence of shocks across wider territorial spaces, such as the European Union.  Shocks 
are a recurrent feature of economic life but their incidence and geography is highly 
variegated, with only a few affecting multiple economies sufficiently to be classified as a 
system-wide shock likely to have affected all regions and impacted different regions with 
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similar force, and thus suitable for cross-comparative analysis. Examples include, the 
recessions of the 1970s instigated by OPEC oil price increases (Dow, 1998), and the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of the late 1990s (Jordà et al, 2012).   
 
In this complex setting, identifying the onset of a particular system-wide shock for 
comparative analysis can be challenging.  Whilst it may be tempting to look for a particular 
incident from which to date a shock, this can serve to confuse cause and effect. For example, 
although the collapse of the US firm Lehmann Brothers is often cited as a key point in the 
recent financial crisis, the roots of this lay in the sub-prime mortgage crisis following the 
collapse of the US housing bubble (Gamble, 2009).  The effects of this reverberated around 
much of the world through a series of complex interactions (Martin, 2011; Hadjimichaelis 
and Hudson, 2014), coupled with second and third order effects channelled through 
financial markets, trade links, and behavioural changes, whereby citizens amended their 
consumption and savings behaviour on the basis of their wider expectations of the future 
(Hadjimichaelis, 2011; Smith, 2013; Hannon, 2014).   
 
In the face of such complexity, developing an anatomy of the shock or crisis is critical in 
understanding the degree to which it has impacted upon regions with equal force at similar 
times. A regional economy may clearly be resilient to one form of shock, but not another 
(Martin and Sunley, 2014). Even broadly similar shocks may have a different frequency in 
different regions or start at different times (Foster, 2010). As such, it is a mistake to seek a 
single year as the fixed turning point from which to analyse resilience to a system-wide 
shock, as it risks mistreating the circumstances of those areas that were affected by the 
12 
 
accurate approach would be to treat each region as an individual entity and consider its 
response to the shock according to its own unique evolutionary trajectory.  
 
A further challenge concerns the time period given for resilience outcomes to be revealed. 
Existing literature suggests that this is very much a matter of judgement. In a study of 
regional economic resilience in the US, Hill et al (2011) consider a region to be resilient if (as 
a minimum) it returns to its prior growth path within a relatively short period of time, 
namely within four years. More generally, questions surround the relationship between 
short-term resilieŶĐe to shoĐks aŶd a ƌegioŶ͛s loŶg-run regional development pattern. 
Martin and Sunley (2014) argue that short-teƌŵ ŵeasuƌes of ƌesilieŶĐe as ͚ďouŶĐe-ďaĐk͛ to 
some pre-shock state or norm, have to be understood as constitutive of long-term regional 
growth paths and development trajectories. As such, understanding short-term resilience 
outcomes may be critical to understanding longer-term patterns of regional convergence 
and divergence. 
 
A final challenge is the scale of analysis. Much analysis is undertaken at the national level, 
but there is increasing interest in the economic resilience of sub-national units, such as 
regions (Fingleton et al, 2012), cities (Capello et al, 2015), or other administrative or 
statistical units (Doran and Fingleton, 2014). Resilience to economic shocks may vary by 
scale however: national economic resilience may not necessarily mean constituent regions 
and localities, with their diverse characteristics and development paths, will necessarily 
exhibit resilience to the same shock (Martin, 2012). 
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3. Measuring economic resilience 
3.1 Constructing the reference state: a business cycle approach 
One of the classic conundrums for studies of resilience is how that resilience should be 
measured.  Whilst some writers have taken the approach of developing a basket of 
indicators (Briguglio et al 2006; CLES, 2010), this may conflate cause and effect.  In order to 
understand what might make a region resilient to economic shocks we need to be able to 
measure its resilience in a way that does not lead to later problems of autocorrelation.   
 
We have chosen to use two data series; firstly the level of employment in a region and, 
secondly, the level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Pragmatically, both are consistently 
available on a comparative basis across the EU territory. Employment is a more meaningful 
measure than GDP as it counts the number of people employed in a region and is less prone 
to revision (see Coyle, 2014).  In addition, it has a social value as there is a tendency in the 
minds of the public and politicians to regard the possession of a job as a strong indication of 
the well-being of an economy.  However, as GDP is a standard measure of economic well-
being and tends to be used to measure entry and exit from recession, we also consider this.  
We use real (in 2005 constant prices) GDP data since this offers a better perspective when 
tracking income and output resilience over a period of time. 
 
Following Martin (2012), our reference state is based upon a measure of absolute resilience 
- that is whether an economy resisted the economic shock; recovered from the economic 
shock, or has yet to recover from the economic shock. We further divide those economies 
that have not yet recovered from the economic shock into those that have begun to witness 
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an upturn in economic activity and those that are experiencing continued downturn. We 
choose to use an absolute measure for two reasons.  Firstly, one can argue that whilst one 
economy may be more resilient than another, if both are mired in economic decline, neither 
have actually proved to be resilient to the economic shock itself. Secondly, measures of 
comparative resilience, such as MartiŶ͛s seŶsitiǀitǇ iŶdeǆ ;2012), prove difficult to 
operationalise on a comparative basis across different national economic circumstances 
owing to methodological limitations.  
 
To understand how resilient regions are, we first need to date their business cycle turning 
points. We can then calculate the amount of GDP or employment loss between the peak and 
trough turning points of the cycle.  In our approach we treat each region as a separate time 
series and then date the individual business cycle turning points. This allows us gauge 
resilience by measuring how much output or employment is lost over downturns, and to 
calculate the time to recovery. This approach builds on Sensier and Artis (2014) which dates 
countries within the UK employment cycles, and adds flexibility to the approach of Martin 
(2012) which assumes that all regions have the same turning point dates as the national 
employment series. 
 
This investigation centres on the classical business cycle, measuring absolute falls in 
economic activity rather than deviations around a trend which are referred to as the growth 
cycle (see Harding and Pagan, 2002 for definition and dissection of the classical cycle). We 
favour this approach since we are interested in specifically measuring the sensitivity of 
regions to economic shocks in a manner that accords with traditional approaches to 
understanding crisis impacts (i.e. in terms of absolute falls in employment and output rather 
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than variations around trend growth rates). This paper applies the cycle dating methodology 
to regional employment and GDP data in the ESPON 31 European countries1 to provide an 
analysis of differential regional responses to several economic shocks since the early 1990s. 
For 28 countries we draw on data from the Cambridge Econometrics European Regional 
Database (see: 
http://www.camecon.com/subnational/subnationaleurope/regionaldatabase.aspx). Data 
was provided at the NUTS 0, NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 spatial scales.  Whilst data for 
much of our sample is available back to 1980, our analysis focused on the period 1990 to 
2011 for which a comprehensive dataset was available.  To complement this we include 
comparable data provided by EXPERIAN plc for the remaining three countries of Switzerland, 
Croatia and Iceland. This data is provided at the NUTS 1 level, and estimated for NUTS 2. 
 
For the purposes of our work, we have defined regions as synonymous with the NUTS 2 
regional classification of Eurostat. Although there are conceptual challenges with this 
approach (McLeod, 2001), the availability of consistent datasets at this scale outweighs 
these difficulties. For comparative purposes we also make use of data at the NUTS 3 
teƌƌitoƌial sĐale, ǁhiĐh ǁe ƌefeƌ to as ͚loĐal͛ iŶ oƌdeƌ to diffeƌeŶtiate from the regional scale. 
 
Following Artis, et al (2004) the economy can be in either of two mutually exclusive phases: 
expansion phase (Et) or recession phase (Rt). The convention is that a peak terminates an 
                                                          
1
 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Romania, Norway, Croatia, 
Switzerland and Iceland. 
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expansion and a trough terminates a recession. To enforce the alternation of peaks and 
troughs it is useful to distinguish turning points within these two phases: 


t
t
t
t
t
t
T
CR
R
P
CE
E
     (1) 
From the continuation of expansion (CEt) we can make a transition to the peak (Pt) or 
continue the expansion, but not vice versa as only 1 tt CRP  is admissible. Analogously, 
from continuation of recession (CRt) we can make a transition to the trough (Tt) but 
1 tt CET  with the probability of 1. The dating rules impose a minimum duration of a 
phase of 1 year as we are analyzing annual data (the popular/media definition of a recession 
is a fall in output in two consecutive quarters). We also impose the minimum length of the 
entire business cycle (from peak to peak) to be 2 years. The maximum length of cycle is 
unlimited and if two business cycle phases occur in quick succession then the maximum 
(highest peak) is dated as the start of the cycle and the minimum (lowest trough) is the end 
of the ĐǇĐle, this Đould theŶ take iŶ tǁo ĐǇĐles ;a ͚douďle dip͛ ƌeĐessioŶͿ oƌ ŵoƌe.  
 
To determine turning points we calculate the first difference of the natural logarithm of 
employment and GDP series separately. When the transformed series is negative we code 
this ǀalue as a ͞ϭ͟ foƌ ƌeĐessioŶ aŶd ǁheŶ it is positiǀe as a ͞Ϭ͟ foƌ aŶ eǆpaŶsioŶ. We date 
the peak turning point as the observation before the recession and the trough turning point 
as the observation before the expansion. We compare our dating algorithm computed in 
Gauss to one available for download in Stata (sbbq.ado by Philippe Bracke, 2011 see 
https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457288.html). This code is for the Harding and 
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Pagan (2002) algorithm and was created for quarterly data but has been adapted for our 
annual data. We then check that peaks and troughs alternate. 
{FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE} 
To operationalise our concept of resilience we refer to the stylized employment cycle in 
Figuƌe ϭ, ǁheƌe peaks aƌe ŵaƌked ͞P͟ aŶd the tƌough ͞T͟ aŶd ǁe Ŷote the Ǉeaƌs ǁheƌe 
these are reached for the NUTS 2 regions. The percentage of employment lost following a 
shock is calculated as the employment level at the trough less the employment level at the 
peak, divided by the peak level. The amplitude/depth of the downturn is measured by the 
height from peak to trough, the duration of the downturn is measured in years by AB, and 
the duration of the full cycle (peak to peak) is AY. We are also interested in the amount of 
time it takes the region to recover to its pre-shock peak and this is shown by RC on the 
graph. This will give us an indication of how quickly the region has recovered to its pre-shock 
level. The steepness of the downturn is calculated as the amplitude/duration. This is the 
remaining side of the triangle i.e. the gradient of the lines S1 into downturn and S2 recovery 
to the next peak. 
 
With regards to regional resilience, we say that a regioŶ is ͞ƌesistaŶt͟ (RS) to an economic 
shock if the growth rate of regional employment remains positive during the period of the 
shock that is experienced in the national (aggregate) series. For those regions that 
experience contractions, if they return to their pre-shock peak then we say they have 
͞ƌeĐoǀeƌed͟ (RC). Foƌ those ƌegioŶs that haǀe ͞Ŷot ƌeĐoǀeƌed͟ ǁe Đategoƌize theŵ as either 
having reached their trough and employment has started to rise again (NR1), or as still to 
reach their trough (NR2). The last year of our sample is 2011. For each region we compare a 
scale of resilience across Europe for the most recent crisis in a map. This provides us with a 
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picture of where regions are located that were (1) resistant to the last shock; (2) have 
recovered or are yet to recover; (3) have reached the trough turning point; or (4) are still in 
decline up to 2011. We carried out an analysis of the observed resilience of the 31 national 
economies in the ESPON territory; 289 NUTS 2 regions within this same space and 1,322 
NUTS 3 territories, using both employment and real GDP data.   
 
3.2 Dating the shock 
Economic downturns are a recurrent feature of national and regional economies. Many of 
the shocks that influence this pattern are regionally, or nationally, specific.  For a 
comparative analysis of resilience, a more widespread incidence of economic shocks is 
required. In order to identify the incidence of shocks across the ESPON space we calculated 
the number of regions which experienced a downturn in employment in any one year from 
1992 to 2011, alongside a similar analysis for downturns in GDP (Figure 2). Since 1992, there 
is no year when there has not been at least one region experiencing a loss of gross 
employment or GDP, with the total number of regions experiencing a decline in GDP always 
being fewer than for employment, apart from 2008-9 in the most recent crisis. The analysis 
indicates two clear periods of pan-European economic downturn:  the first around the 1990s 
and the second more recent shock from around 2008/9. A third shock with a smaller 
incidence can also be identified around 2003 (during this period some regions in Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Portugal, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania were in recession). 
The differing nature, scale and origins of these two major system-wide shocks help point to 
their ultimately asymmetric effects. The crisis of the early 1990s represented the cumulative 
effect of a mix of exogenous and domestic shocks which differed between countries (see 
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Dow, 1998). Norway went into recession in 1988 after the world oil price halved in 1987, 
hitting its exports. In the UK, following the deregulation of the financial system in the mid-
1980s, there was a boom fuelled by increased consumer confidence and favourable terms of 
trade which lead to large increases in household and corporate debt. The Government 
raised short-term interest rates in 1988-9 to exert downward pressure on inflation which 
coupled with unsustainable levels of debt lead to a loss of confidence, a house price crash 
and fall in real GDP 1990-1 (see Sensier et al, 2002). The boom in Germany, associated with 
reunification in 1990 and increased spending and investment in East Germany, came to a 
halt going in 1991 when federal taxes and interest rates were raised to curb inflation. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent trade shock to Finland lead to a real 
estate price crash wich affected many of its European trading partners. 
The 2008 economic crisis is considered to be globally widespread in its effects, although 
geography played a complex role in both its formation and fermentation (French et al, 
2009). A sub-prime mortgage crisis which had its origins in certain localised US housing 
markets was rapidly spread internationally through the interdependence of states, localities 
and institutions within global financial networks (Martin, 2011). As the crisis mutated from a 
financial crisis in the bankiŶg seĐtoƌ to a fisĐal Đƌisis of the state, it ĐoŶditioŶed a ͚dǇŶaŵiĐ of 
ĐasĐadiŶg geogƌaphiĐ effeĐts͛ ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ aďuŶdaŶt ǀaƌiatioŶs iŶ ďoth iŵpaĐts aŶd 
responses (Harvey, 2011; p. 17). The scale and uniqueness of its effects is further revealed 
by the fact 
that it is the only occasion during the period of observation that more economies 
experienced a decline in GDP than in levels of employment.  
{FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE} 
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Based on the turning points identified, we map the unfolding of the economic crisis across 
Europe for regional employment in Figure 3.  The first signs of the emerging crisis were 
revealed in 2006, with the effects of the economic shock gathering pace through 2007 and 
2008.  Regions in Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania and the UK were 
amongst the first to experience employment declines. By 2009, a fully-fledged crisis had 
engulfed the European economies with 238 regions recording downturns in their 
employment levels. During 2009, however, the first signs of recovery were also apparent, 
with regions in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Hungary, Malta, Sweden and the UK all 
having reached their trough employment level. This variable temporal geography forcefully 
demonstrates the importance of not treating the shock as an event that affects all regions 
simultaneously, even implicitly.   
{FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE} 
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3.3 Timescale for resilience: how long is long enough? 
To be resilient it is not, of course, sufficient to simply recover to pre-shock peak levels of 
economic activity. Most economies achieve this eventually. The question is the timescale 
over which this occurs. Here it is instructive to learn from past experience. Examination of 
the last major pan-European economic downturn around the onset of the 1990s illustrates 
that the rate of recovery to pre-shock employment levels is widely distributed (Figure 4).  
The loŶg ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ ͚tail͛ is ĐleaƌlǇ ǀisiďle iŶ Figuƌe 4, ďut it is also eǀideŶt that the spƌead of 
regions across different durations is relatively stable between four to ten-year recovery 
durations.  Further analysis of this data suggests that it took four years for 20% of regions to 
recover to pre-shock employment levels following the early 1990s crisis, providing a possible 
benchmark for comparison with current speeds of recovery.  Two-thirds of regions had 
recovered to pre-shock employment levels within a decade of entering employment 
downturn. 
{FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE} 
Evidence from the 1990s recession also highlights how a significant proportion of regions 
(17.6%) never returned to peak levels of employment, despite the subsequent long 
economic boom (Figure 5). Blanchard and Summers (1986) describe European 
unemployment hysteresis where unemployment growth was persistent and lead to an 
permanent increase in unemployment after economic shocks. From Figure 5 we can see that 
employment did not recover in many regions of Eastern Europe including Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania (which also did not recover its GDP level), Romania and Poland, as also found by 
Cuestas et al (2011, p. 514) ǁho suggest ͞the degree of persistence appears to reflect the 
different levels of economic and institutional development in the countries and possibly also 
the role of the government͟. In Western Europe 4 regions in Sweden did not recover along 
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with one in Finland and some of the former East Germany which is to be expected (after re-
unification leaving behind full employment). Although the Spanish regions employment level 
recovered from the 1990s recession, Garcia-Cintado et al (2014) document how Spanish 
regional unemployment has been persistently high for the last decade. Krugman (2011) 
describes how future capacity can be depressed by lack of investment and austerity 
measures after a crisis leaving a portion of the workforce permanently unemployable.  
{FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE} 
A small, but much less significant, number of regions (1.4%) also exhibited hysteresis in 
levels of GDP. These hysteretic effects caution against any assumption that returning to 
previous peak levels of employment (or GDP) should necessarily form a natural objective 
following an economic shock. It is also suggestive of the important interplay between 
economic shocks and longer-term processes of structural transformation. Figure 5 also 
ideŶtifies those ͚ƌesistaŶt͛ ƌegioŶs that did Ŷot experience an economic downturn during this 
period, ranging from 16 regions (5.8%) which maintained employment growth throughout 
the wider downturn and 45 (16%) which maintained GDP growth. 
 
4. Economic Resilience Revealed 
Our analysis reveals that at the national level only four economies – Germany, Luxembourg, 
Poland and Switzerland - were able to resist the economic shock and maintain, or increase, 
their level of employment (Table 1). Only one economy – Poland – was able to resist a fall in 
its level of GDP. By 2011, five economies had recovered to their pre-shock employment 
level, whilst eight had recovered to their pre-shock level of GDP. Twenty-two economies 
remained mired in the aftermath of the shock, with ten still to experience an upturn in their 
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levels of employment.  The situation was similar for levels of GDP activity, although here 
more national economies had achieved a turning point.  
{TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE} 
At a regional level, around a tenth of regions (12%) did not experience any fall in recorded 
employment levels, whilst almost a quarter (23%) had experienced a fall in employment but, 
by 2011, had recovered to their pre-crisis peak. On this basis we suggest that around one-
third of regions in the ESPON European space were resilient to the economic shock of 
2008/09.   
In contrast, two-thirds of regions were still to recover by 2011, divided evenly between 
those that had passed the trough of the downturn, and those still to register the end of 
employment decline. Of those that were still to reach a turning point, only ten had first 
recorded a downturn in employment post-2009 and so it is not the case that this simply 
reflects the timing of the onset of economic downturn.  
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The distribution of regional economic resilience, as measured by employment, is set out in Figure 6, 
which illustrates a strong geography of resilience. This geography is clearly influenced by national 
patterns, reinforcing recent evidence on the importance of national effects in regional resilience 
(Dijkstra et al, 2015a). The severity of crisis impacts and the evidence of low resilience in peripheral 
parts of southern and eastern Europe, particularly Spain, Greece, Italy, Latvia and Estonia is strongly 
evident, again reinforcing findings from early comparative studies of crisis effects (e.g. Groot et al, 
2011) and emerging country-specific studies of resilience (such as Palaskas et al, 2015; and Di Caro, 
2015a). However, important pockets of recovery and non-recovery are also apparent within this 
overall geography, highlighting the value of a more comprehensive cross-comparative analysis and 
an approach which dates regional crisis impacts and measures resilience in terms of both resistance 
and recovery. 
{FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE} 
A similar, though not identical, geography can be identified when we map the economic resilience of 
regions using GDP data (Figure 7). One of the features of the recent crisis was that, overall, 
employment levels proved to be more resilient than levels of economic output. From Figure 7 it is 
apparent that it was only in Poland that regions were able to maintain pre-crisis levels of GDP 
activity. However, more regions have recovered or begun the recovery process than is the case for 
employment.  Some clear geographical patterns of resilience emerge, which echo those identified in 
the case of employment.  What is also apparent is that there is less heterogeneity between regions 
within nations in terms of employment resilience than GDP resilience. This may reflect the relative 
homogeneity of regional labour markets and their responsiveness within national economies, and/or 
regional price differences within and between countries (see below). 
{FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE} 
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Comparing the two approaches, around half of regions exhibit a similar level of resilience under 
either the employment or GDP measure; with slightly more regions exhibiting stronger employment 
resilience than the numbers exhibiting stronger GDP resilience (Figure 8). 
{FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE} 
Resilience can also be a more localized phenomenon, with neighbouring areas experiencing different 
patterns of resilience, depending upon specific local particularities. Overall, a slightly greater 
proportion of NUTS 3 territories were able to resist the crisis than was the case at the NUTS 2 scale, 
and a slightly lower proportion of those that had not yet recovered have begun an economic upturn 
{TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE}.   
5. Reflections on the approach 
This analysis usefully highlights that the economic crisis of 2008/09 was not a single event but rather 
a series of closely connected events that together amounted to a major economic shock. Different 
places were affected by these events at different times. Dating the shock as occurring in 2008/09 
simply reflects the fact that this was, on average, when most economies were affected.  It overlooks 
the early and late entrants.  The business cycle approach adopted for this work is a major innovation 
in approaches to measuring the resilience of economies to economic shocks, as it allows a more 
nuanced measurement of the particular response of each region.  
 
One implication of using the business-cycle approach is that we must recognise that economic 
circumstances are rarely static. Whilst the crisis did not start at the same time for all regions, nor did 
it end at the same time. The consequences are also long-lasting, as witnessed by the launch of 
quantitative easing by the European Central Bank (ECB) in January 2015 (ECB, 2015). Regional 
performance against key indicators is continuously changing in response to a myriad of external and 
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internal factors.  This harks back to the important questioŶ of ǁhat ǁe aƌe ŵeasuƌiŶg the ƌegioŶ͛s 
resilience to - the initial shock or the second, third or even fourth wave consequences of this? The 
case of Poland is pertinent here. Whilst the Polish economy as a whole did not experience a 
downturn in employment during the crisis, it did begin to falter from 2010 and had not recovered by 
2013 (Eurostat, 2015). The question is whether this suggests that the economy was not resilient to 
the initial shock itself.  In the absence of alternative evidence we argue that for the purposes of a 
cross-comparative analysis it is valid to suggest that the Polish economy was indeed resilient to the 
initial economic shock, but has proved less resilient to the longer-lasting malaise of the European 
economy and the effects of later shocks, such as the EU-Russian sanctions. This requires further 
analysis however. 
The use of employment or GDP as the primary indicators of resilience can be debated.  This does not 
change the overall efficacy of the approach, as indeed other indicators could be used.  Inter alia, this 
might include unemployment or employment rates, or household incomes. All have their advantages 
and disadvantages. Our work also demonstrates that the use of GDP rather than employment 
provides moderately different outcomes.  This may reflect different structural characteristics of the 
regions concerned and regional price difference between and across countries, both of which 
warrant further analysis.  However, this is also due to the choices made by actors regarding desired 
outcomes.  That actors make choices between maintaining employment and retaining output levels 
was clearly demonstrated in the past crisis.  These choices also differed from those made in previous 
downturns (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010).  Similarly, national contexts also vary, with countries such 
as Sweden placing a higher emphasis on maintaining income equalities within society than, for the 
example, the UK.  Is one measure better than another?  That may prove to be a political choice. The 
clear value of the approach is that it enables an objective assessment of which economies were 
resilient in terms of employment outcomes, or GDP outcomes, and those that were not.  This 
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provides the foundation for cross-comparative analysis to understand the reasons for this, and why 
other economies were not resilient. 
 
There is a risk in choosing to use an absolute measure of resilience rather than one that is relative, of 
overlooking those economies that did better than might be expected, despite the economic shock.  
This could be the case for regions in countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal or Spain for example 
where their performance has been better than the average across the country.  Whilst this argument 
has validity when considering regions within a single country, for the purposes of a more widespread 
analysis it is problematic. This is because it could suggest that a region that experiences a major 
reduction in employment is more resilient than another that experiences a small number of job 
losses, simply because of their performance against the national average in their respective 
countries. 
 
Similarly, we have avoided the temptation to analyse growth rates in an economy. There may be 
different paths to resilience, some of which involve short deep responses; others that are of longer 
duration but shallower. Neither is necessarily better. The crucial detail is the ability of an economy to 
adapt to the new circumstances and restore levels of economic output and/or employment.  
Likewise we do not compare pre-shock growth rates with those post-shock. The risk is that pre-shock 
growth rates were unsustainable and undesirable in that they created the conditions for the 
economic shock itself (as was arguably the case in Ireland).  Whilst focusing on levels of output 
and/or employment may not entirely get around this problem, we argue that growth rates are more 
likely to be unsustainable than employment and output levels.   
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One potential criticism of the approach outlined here is that it is only able to shed light on the ability 
of an economy to respond to an economic shock in the short-term. It thus provides valuable insights 
oŶ the aďilitǇ of aŶ eĐoŶoŵǇ to ͚ďouŶĐe-ďaĐk͛ fƌoŵ a shoĐk, ďut is less iŶfoƌŵatiǀe ƌegaƌdiŶg longer-
term transformations oƌ ͚ƌeŶeǁal͛ ;MaƌtiŶ, ϮϬϭϮͿ. This may offer an imbalanced perspective as it is 
possible that resilience in the short-term may mask weaknesses that impede resilience in the longer-
term. We acknowledge this perspective but suggest that this does not affect the value of the 
approach as a mechanism for presenting a robust baseline for cross-comparative studies. The need 
to explore how to understand and evaluate long-term regional transformation in response to 
economic shocks represents a critical area requiring further research. 
In addition, our analysis has not examined how resilience in one region may be a function of 
resilience in neighbouring regions. There is some evidence to suggest that spatial interdependence 
between regions through, for example, domestic trade linkages may shape the resilience of certain 
regions (Di Caro, 2015b). However, both the means of assessing such interpedence and the nature of 
its effects needs to be subject to further development and wider application. This represents an 
interesting area for further research. 
A clear message of the analysis undertaken for this work is that different shocks have different 
outcomes. Regions that were resistant to the effects of the economic shocks of the early 1990s 
were, on the whole, not resistant to the economic shock of 2008/09. Comparison with the 1990s 
downturn also illustrates differences in the nature of resilience. During that downturn less than 5% 
of regions were resistant to the employment effects of the downturn, compared to 12% during the 
current crisis. In contrast, almost a fifth of regions (19%) demonstrated GDP resistance, compared to 
just 5% during the most recent crisis. Equally, since the onset of economic decline linked to the 
recent crisis, 23% of regions have recovered to their pre-shock employment levels within three 
years. In comparison, following the downturn of the 1990s, it took four years for 22% of regions to 
recover to pre-shock employment levels. Experience following the 1990s downturn further 
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illustrates the longer-term structural changes that can influence levels of economic recovery, raising 
important questions about the nature of longer-term transformation and adaptation.   
 
Economic resilience is not, of course, synonymous with our traditional understanding of economic 
strength. Analysis of the distribution of resilience across Figures 6 and 7 demonstrates that several 
strong economies i.e. those with high levels of GDP, such as Île-de-France (Fr) and Emilia-Romagna 
(It), have proved not to be resilient to the economic shock, whilst others, Such as Brandenburg (De) 
and Podlaskie (Pl), which are less developed have proved to be resilient. This may also suggest that 
there are different pathways to resilience and reminds us that resilience cannot be treated as a 
necessarily desirable concept especially where resilience outcomes are not progressive or 
transformative (Bristow and Healy, 2014).  Again, one is not necessarily better than another but 
suggests that a deeper analysis of the processes at work is required, rather than simply seeking to 
replicate a small number of common policy objectives across all regions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has outlined an approach to operationalising the concept of resilience in the challenging 
context of cross-comparative research. The method developed has focused on developing a method 
for measuring resilience outcomes in terms of both GDP and employment for regions across Europe 
in respect of economic crises. It is novel in respect of its development of a method for dating the 
onset of the effects of a shock at the regional level. This allows for the development of a rich analysis 
of the shock and its spatial and temporal dynamics. It has also allowed for detailed analysis of the 
differences in amplitude and duration of shock recovery processes across regions. As such, it has 
developed a means of identifying the reference state against which resilience outcomes can be 
measured in comparative contexts, and provided a valuable means of categorising regions according 
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to the different phases of their resilience performance i.e. whether they are resistant, recovered or 
not recovered. It thus provides an objective means of identifying which economies were resilient to 
an economic shock and which were not, in a manner which is easy to replicate.  
 
This analysis has certainly captured the most resilient economies and the least, and whilst there may 
be some debate at the margins, it provides a very valuable baseline for future research. The fact that 
some economies enter a crisis earlier and others later, means that this more detailed understanding 
is essential if we are to fully understand regional resilience. Whilst one might get away with a single 
reference year for resilience analysis in a single country, one cannot do so at a European scale 
(which is where the real value of cross-comparative analysis can be seen owing to different policy 
contexts). 
 
This analysis thus focuses on revealed resilience. It does not in and of itself tell us anything about 
resilience capacities or why different regions exhibited different resilience outcomes in relation to 
the economic shocks in question. Neither does it tell us whether resilient outcomes are necessarily 
desirable. Critically, a degree of judgement will surround what resilience outcomes are regarded as 
desirable. For example, a ƌetuƌŶ to pƌeǀious ͚Ŷoƌŵs͛ ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe ƌeƋuiƌed – soŵe ƌegioŶ͛s ŵaǇ ǁaŶt 
more growth, others more stability, others no growth, particularly if transformative agendas are in 
evidence (such as meeting economic objectives within redefined environmental and social capacities 
and goals). Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ pƌoǀidiŶg a ƌoďust ŵeasuƌe of a ƌegioŶ͛s ƌefeƌeŶĐe state iŶ teƌŵs of 
resilience performance, it develops a metric which may be subject to further analysis against various 
different components of resilience capacity. The critical point is that it avoids conflating resilience 
capacities (causes) and resilience outcomes (effects) in one measure. As such, it provides a 
potentially more useful platform for the diagnosis of regional resilience for policy and practice 
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purposes. It also usefully highlights that resilience is a complex, multi-dimensional entity that is 
unlikely to be measurable by one simple indicator or composite index alone. 
Further research is now needed to build on this baseline and, in particular, to develop a more 
rigorous understanding of the different factors shaping observed resilience outcomes, or the 
relationship between resilience capacities and resilience outcomes. Further analysis is also needed 
of the role of important national effects and spatial interdependencies between regions in shaping 
observed resilience outcomes. There also remain unanswered questions concerning whether 
regional trajectories before the crisis relate to how resilient regions ultimately were to it. This 
represents an exciting agenda for spatial economic analysts. 
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Figure 1: Stylised Employment Cycle  
 
 
Figure 2: Count of Regions in ESPON 31 experiencing Employment Downturn (red) or GDP 
Downturn (blue) 
 
 
P = Peak 
T = Trough 
RC = Recovery 
S = slope of 
growth path  
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Figure 3: Temporal spread of economic crisis (2006-2011) 
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Figure 4: Speed of recovery to pre-crisis peak employment levels (early 1990s, number of NUTS 2 
regions) 
 
Source: adapted from Cambridge Economics datasets  
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Figure 5: Historical resilience outcomes (economic shock of early 1990s) 
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Figure 6: Distribution of regional economic resilience (NUTS 2, employment, peak year to 2011) 
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Figure 7: Distribution of regional output resilience (NUTS 2, GDP, peak year to 2011) 
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Figure 8: GDP vs Employment Resilience 
 
Source: ESPON ECR2 
Table 1: National patterns of resilience to the 2008 economic crisis
2
 
 Employment measure GDP measure 
Resisted LU, DE, CH, PL PL 
Recovered by 2011 NO, SE, MT, AT, BE DE, NO, SE, CH, AT, FR, MT, SK 
Not Recovered: upturn 
experienced by 2011 
IS, UK, FR, NL, IT, FI, LT, EE, CY, 
CZ, SK, HU 
IS, UK, IE, LU, NL, PT, ES, IT, DK, 
FI, EE, LV, LT, CZ, SL, HU, RO, 
BU, CY 
Not recovered: no upturn 
experienced by 2011 
IE, PT, ES, DK, LV, SL, HR, RO, 
BU, EL 
HR, EL 
 
                                                          
2 Country abbreviations follow standard European norms and are based on national language 
conventions eg Greece = EL (Ellada) 
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Table 2: Employment Resilience of NUTS 3 Territories 
Resilience NUTS 3 NUTS 2 
 
Number of 
regions Proportion (%) 
Number of 
regions Proportion (%) 
Resistant (RS) 214 16.2 32 11.5 
Recovered (RC) 314 23.8 68 24.5 
Not recovered but in upturn 364 27.5 87 31.3 
Not recovered and no upturn 430 32.5 91 32.7 
Source: ESPON ECR2 (number of observations: NUTS3=1,322, NUTS2= 278) 
 
 
